Puzzled by how geographical changes in the Arctic might cause changes in state behavior the authors of this article have been inspired to return to the roots of geopolitical reasoning. By combining insights from the intellectual roots of the geopolitical tradition with empirical data on geographical changes as well as policy changes in the Arctic today, we investigate the degree to which geopolitics, in the sense of geography influencing politics, is still a useful approach in the discipline of International Relations (IR). In limiting our primary focus to the state level, and investigating the period since the turn of the millennium, this article seeks to develop new knowledge concerning if, how, and to what extent geography matters in international politics.
INTRODUCTION
During the last few decades, few innovative studies have been conducted within what could be labeled the 'classical geopolitical' tradition, which in its original version proposes that states' foreign policies are heavily influenced, if not determined, by their physical geography. In contrast, what has come to be called the 'critical geopolitical' tradition has flourished, presenting several innovative studies questioning issues such as static conceptions of space, state centricity, the lack of normative considerations in classical approaches, and the role of subjectivity in world affairs (Sheehan, 2005, p. 145; Dodds, Kuus, & Sharp, 2013, pp. 6-7; Guzzini, 2012) . At its core, critical geopolitics argues that space is narrated and that geography is not 'objective' but a social construction; an understanding providing a very different analytical point of departure for a state's standing in world affairs, especially concerning the sources and variability of state power. Nevertheless, classical geopolitical reasoning continues to be influential:
Despite the criticism, the geopolitical approach has been extremely influential for half a century[….] All the post 1945 [U.S.] presidents had an overarching vision of the U.S. national security that was explicitly geopolitical and directly traceable to Mackinder's heartland thesis (Sheehan, 2005) .
However, while being popular in the corridors of power, such an observation does certainly not render the classical geopolitical assumptions right. But given its popularity, and in spite of insightful criticism by critical geopolitics, this article asks the question if there are cases in world politics where elements of the classical reasoning might have merit. These could be cases illustrating that ideas from the traditional approach also have explanatory power today, even when taking into account insights and critique from critical geopolitics.
One of the challenges of testing theories about how geography and politics relate to one another is that, aside from sudden natural disasters and direct and indirect human intervention, physical geography tends to change very slowly over time. Yet the accelerating effects of climate change in the Arctic over the last decades have provided an unusual instance in which geographical realities have changed faster than what is usually thought of. The rapidly shrinking Arctic sea ice, the new potential of trans-Arctic shipping routes, and competition over living and nonliving Arctic resources create a rare opportunity to address how changes in Arctic geography interact with political institutions in terms of affecting the relative power of states and their ability to achieve their political goals and establish or change norms and institutions.
Triggered by observing how physical changes in the Arctic take place in parallel with political developments in the same region, this article investigate whether the classical roots of geopolitics could help identifying any relationship between these two developments (Jørgensen, 2010, p. 79, 173, 213; Sidaway, Mamadouh, & Power 2013; Sheehan, 2005, p. 145; Chapman, 2011; Brutschin & Schubert, 2016) . With changes such as ocean warming, ocean acidification, and rapidly shrinking sea ice, the Arctic Ocean is at present not only becoming navigable during the summer season but also facilitates increased human activity in a broad range of areas stretching from tourism and research to the utilization of living and non-living natural resources such as fisheries and oil and gas resources (Haug et al., 2017; Buixadé Farré et al., 2014; Armstrong, 2015) . Climate change is therefore not only reshaping the physical geographies of the North but also its commercial, political, and scientific relevance and importance. The Arctic is hence suitable to our investigation, which seeks to identify a potential interplay between geography and politics, or in other words, a potential geographical component of practical international relations. This is an approach that also finds parallels in recent critique raised by critical theorist, drawing attention to how critical geopolitics might have 'over-invested [in] the representational, cultural and the interpretive dimensions of geopolitics without paying attention to the important insights that a "more-than-human" approach brings to the fore' (Squire, 2015, p. 140) . This article thus aims to respond to the need to engage materialist approaches in current geopolitical analysis and thus confronts the currently still inadequate inclusion of the 'materialist turn' in the recent debate about the reshaping of critical geopolitics.
Concretely, we respond to the need to look into the 'intra-actions' between physical and social forces in the form of a 'material discursive' approach to geopolitics or a geopolitical analysis of power that examines 'material discursive intra-actions.' Or very short: We 'go material' (Squire, 2015, pp. 139-142) .
In limiting our primary focus to the state level and investigating only the period since the turn of the millennium, this article seeks to develop new knowledge concerning if, how, and to what extent geography matters in international politics. We ask whether changes in physical geography can fully or partly explain changes in states' power potential, understood as the states' ability to reach political outcomes, influence (non-)decisions -that is upholding the status quo -or mold power structures, norms, and rules in international relations.
In answering this question, the paper presents four cases related to international relations in the Arctic. Based on empirical evidence from these cases, the paper investigates whether some actors are either gaining or losing influence as a consequence of climatic and geographical changes in the Arctic. From this investigation, we will conclude by discussing whether and how a unique geographic component actually matters or not in international relations.
From Classical to Critical Geopolitics
An original definition of the word 'geopolitics' is 'the study of the influence of geographical factors on state behavior', or, in other words, how international political behavior may be understood, explained, or predicted by the application of geographic variables, such as location, size, topography, climate, distribution of natural resources and population, or the global distribution of sea and land (Griffiths, O'Callaghan, & Roach, 2008, p. 123; Evans & Newnham, 1998, pp. 197-198) .
While dating back to the late 19 th century and having intellectual roots in both social Darwinism and European imperialist thinking of the early 20 th century, the term 'geopolitics' was for a long time particularly tainted by pseudo-scientific attempts by Nazi-Germany's chief geographer Karl Haushofer to justify the imperialistic and aggressive posture of the Third Reich (Evans & Newnham, 1998, p. 198; Dodds et al., 2013, p. 1; Painter & Jeffrey, 2009, p. 202) . The problematic ideological heritage has, in addition to the scientific shortcomings, hampered political theorists in applying insight from the classical tradition (Hochberg & Sloan, 2017, pp. 575-581) . This article is an attempt to identify ways how physical, geographical factors could be identified to potentially influence policy processes, while not taking a deterministic view or falling in the 'trap of object fetishism' (Squire, 2015, p. 149) .
At the end of the 20 th century, many of the tenets of classical geopolitics and positivism in social sciences were -as mentioned earlier -challenged by critical thinkers. The turn was in many respects a parallel to the 'post-positivist' or 'constructivist turn' in (particularly European) IR theory (Dalby, 1991; Smith, 2000; Waever, 2000) . According to the critical geopolitical approach, space is essentially narrated and thus highly contextual and dependent on social constructions, discourses, and moldable identities (Dalby, 1991; Tuathail, 1996; Agnew, 2006) .
With roots in constructivism, critical theory, poststructuralist traditions, feminism, and postcolonial critique, critical geopolitics today has become 'an integral part of mainstream human geography' where it has broadened the understanding of spatiality and subjectivity in world affairs (Dodds et al., 2013, p. 7, 10) . Also in the current Arctic context, observations of how geography matters in political discourses should receive greater attention, such as how changes of ice extent and the mapping of a fluctuating ice edge are interlinked with state politics in countries like Norway and Canada (Steinberg & Kristoffersen, 2017) .
The term 'geopolitics' is often attributed to the late 19 th century Swedish political scientist Rudolf Kjellén (1864 Kjellén ( -1922 . Kjellén introduced the term in 1899 in an article in Ymer, a Swedish geographical journal, and later defined it in a 1905 article in the German Geographische Zeitschrift (Kjellén, 1899, p. 283) . According to Kjellén, geopolitics is the study of how the location of a state (which was itself understood as a 'geographical organism' and spatial phenomenon) vis-à-vis other states, plus how that same state's territorial form, size, and other geographical factors might determine its behavior. A state's placement on the world map hence mattered. This idea can be viewed as being almost self-evident, for example in the way a land-locked state 'naturally' has different foreign policy priorities compared to those of an insular state (Griffiths et al., 2008, pp.123-124 ). Yet, the implications of this statement may have a greater reach because of the determinism it potentially implies, as major issues in world politics simply could be explained by looking at the map. Such issues include the repeatedly isolationist tendencies within U.S. foreign policy, which have been explained by its 'remote' and sheltered geographical placement between two oceans to the West and East. In a similar way, one could argue that the complicated relationship between Russia and Western Europe makes sense, given the lack of natural geographical borders, such as ocean or mountains, which would give the Russia natural protection against its European neighbors (Griffiths et al., 2008, pp.124-125) .
Geopolitical reasoning with assumptions and hypotheses on how geography is connected to issues of state power has been applied to varying degrees during the last century (Sheehan, 2005, pp. 21-25; Agnew, 2006) . A common feature of geopolitical research has been to base hypotheses on counterfactual reasoning where evidence is drawn from making comparisons to other more or less similar cases. Applying counterfactual reasoning is an appropriate and relevant method, and it is widely used in the social sciences as well as in related disciplines like history (Tetlock & Belkin, 1996) . Yet while 'geopolitical hypotheses' might be supported or weakened by counterfactual reasoning and comparisons, the nature of such claims is often hard to test empirically. It is simply difficult to manipulate geography -that is, to move mountain ranges, rivers, or oceans. Referring to the abovementioned example of U.S. isolationism, actually testing out whether the U.S. would behave differently if it were connected to the Eurasian mainland is hard to verify.
Yet the Arctic is indeed changing geographically due to climate change, and resulting in the emergence of a new, open ocean more quickly than most observers had imagined (AMAP, 2017) . These rapid geographical changes offer a unique 'test laboratory' hardly ever available to political scientists. Instead of counterfactual reasoning, the real changes occurring to the Arctic's physical geography make an investigation of the relationship between state policy, power structures, and geographical changes possible. It is worth specifying that while geography should not be seen as a deterministic factor in the sense of leaving out human reasoning, cultural practice, or the value of political decision making, geographical factors might still perform limiting or enabling functions in certain political processes. In focusing on how the changing geography of the Arctic interacts with institutional features of Arctic politics, and how such changes are connected to shifts in the power potential of the Arctic states, this article sketches some key changes in Arctic geographical conditions and puts forward four cases of Arctic politics worthy of closer scrutiny.
Political Consequences of Emerging Arctic Geographies
During the last two decades, the Arctic has gone through a profound transformation due to the rapidly shrinking sea ice of the Arctic Ocean. The changes have had significant implications for Arctic states, particularly in the way the Arctic Ocean has become increasingly navigable for shipping activities. Inter-ocean traffic between the Pacific and the Atlantic along the Northern Sea Route (NSR) following Russia's northern coast has increased over the last years, even though a dip in the most recent years has been experienced (see CHNL Information Office, "NSR Transit Statistics", accessible at http://www.arctic-lio.com/nsr_transits). . This is still in no comparison to the established routes through the Suez and Panama Canals, which experience around 17,000 and 13,000 transits per year, respectively (see Suez Canal Authority. accessible at www.suezcanal.gov.eg, and Panama Canal Authority, accessible at www.pancanal.com).
However, destinational Arctic shipping -from one specific place in the Arctic to destinations farther south or vice versa -is also on the rise enhancing the importance of ice-free waters. For example, Russia's first offshore oil field in the Arctic, the Prirazlomnoye field, went into production in December 2013 (Staalesen, 2014) , and the first cargo of liquefied natural gas (LNG) left the large onshore Yamal LNG project in December 2017 (Total, 2017) , resulting in significantly more shipping activity in the region. Export from these and other fields in the Russian Arctic are assumed to benefit from enhanced NSR sailing conditions. Also, Norway has large ongoing exploration and production activities in the Barents Sea, including the Goliat oil field and the Snøhvit gas field, and a couple of shipments of LNG from Snøhvit have already sailed along the NSR to Japan. In 2017 a record number (92) of new oil exploration blocks in the Barents Sea were announced by the Norwegian government, a development that was paralleled with an all-time high in the number of planned exploration wells to be drilled in the Barents Sea in one year (Reuters, 2017; Offshore Energy Today, 2017) . Attention should also be paid to how changes in water temperatures potentially impact the distribution of living marine resources, such as fish stocks. Such changes are expected to have led species and their prey to migrate northwards due to warmer temperatures (Haug et al., 2017; Bouchard et al., 2017; Christiansen, Mecklenburg, & Karamushko, 2014) . For example, in late 2013 mackerel was observed outside Longyearbyen, Svalbard, for the first time (Berge et al., 2015) .
In following the purpose of this paper, we ask what are the political consequences of these geographic changes? Are some actors empowered by these geographical changes while others are losing influence? Do these changes impact different actors' ability to set the agenda in Arctic politics? Are there structural changes taking place with respect to who defines the rules and norms, written and unwritten, in the international politics of the Arctic? To answer these questions, four cases have been selected. In delineating our timeframe from the first years after the turn of the millennium until today, we isolate a critical period (15-20 years), during which substantial changes took place in Arctic geography and politics. In the middle of this period, it became clear that the melting of Arctic sea ice accelerated much faster than what was anticipated just a few years before. In particular, it became obvious that the predictions and model runs set by the fourth IPCC report of 2007 did not fit the empirical evidence gathered around the same time it was published. For example, while the most radical IPCC model anticipated a loss in September sea ice of 5.4% per decade (the predicted average was only 2.5%), the actual decline during the modelled time frame (from 1953 to 2006) was 7.8% (NSIDC, 2007) .
Four cases in a Changing Arctic
Due to the climatic and geographical changes occurring in the Arctic region, we have identified four cases and questions worth scrutinizing. In each case, we compare the situation in the early 2000s with the last few years in the 2010s. In this context 'empowering' implies whether changes in the states' power potential can be derived from geographical changes that follow from a warmer climate in the Arctic. Power potential, or political clout, will be understood as having the ability to perform as an active Arctic player and being perceived as such. This includes having the ability to reach preferred political outcomes, to put issues on the agenda and to keep issues off the agenda. It further refers to the ability to influence norm development, either in written (legal) or unwritten form.
Power is understood as a relational, multifaceted concept explored by scholars such as Robert A. Dahl (1957) , Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz (1962) , and Steve Lukes (1974) . The concept hence contains both its objective measurable dimension -A gets B to do something B would otherwise not have done -as well as a deeper, structural understanding which includes issues such as the ability to create unwritten norms. Finally, the analysis will also be attentive to inasmuch identified changes in political clout are unrelated to a changing geography or, in other words, are due to factors not related to physical geography.
Empowerment of coastal states:
One deciding feature of physical geography that may have an effect on power structures in an opening Arctic region with receding sea ice is if a state has coastlines at the Arctic Ocean and its adjacent seas. We thus ask: Have the "Arctic Five" (A5), the five coastal Arctic states Canada, Denmark/Greenland, Norway, Russia, and the U.S., been In this case we ask if the Arctic Five (A5) have been empowered due to their direct access to the Arctic Ocean, unlike the three Arctic states with no Arctic Ocean coast. The case for this inquiry appears especially strong in the sense of economically empowering Arctic coastal states, given that most of the resources newly accessible due to the changing climate are expected to be offshore or marine resources. The economic domain is important to include also in geopolitical writings and is an area that researchers have pointed out has been lacking in many analysis conducted both by classically oriented as well as critical geopolitical scholars (Brutschin & Schubert, 2016, p. 150) . According to the 2008 U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), the Arctic is expected to hold about 22% of the world's undiscovered conventional oil and natural gas resources, which amounts to about 30% of the world's undiscovered natural gas, 13% of the world's undiscovered oil, and 20% of the world's undiscovered natural gas liquids (NGL). Of these resources, 84% are expected to be offshore and located mostly in shallower waters within the jurisdiction of the Arctic coastal states (Bird et al., 2008; Gautier et al., 2009 Gautier et al., , pp. 1175 Gautier et al., -1177 .
With less sea ice, these resources are expected to become easier to access, especially on the large, shallow shelf off northern Russia but also potentially in the waters north of Alaska's coasts and in Greenlandic waters (Pumphrey, 2015, p. 266; Bertelsen, Justinussen, & Smith,2015, p. 22; Byers, 2013, pp. 2-3) . As outlined above, shipping activities especially along Russia's northern coast are expected to grow. New inter-ocean trade corridors in combination with enhanced destinational shipping activities are expected to be a source of new economic value. Having a coastline bordering the Arctic Ocean thus matters with respect to benefitting the most from these developments.
However, less ice in the Arctic does not automatically make new international trade routes commercially interesting. Goods to be traded with economic benefit between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans need to be available, as well as markets where such goods are in demand.
Infrastructure along the Arctic routes-ports, logistical support, and search and rescue facilities-have to be sufficiently developed. Against the backdrop of the prevailing harsh environmental and weather conditions, the viability and seasonality concerns of the shipping industry need to be addressed (Buixadé Farré et al., 2014; Humpert & Raspotnik, 2012; Lasserre & Pelletier, 2011) . Nevertheless, the decreasing sea ice could be viewed as the impetusassuming other necessary conditions as outlined above are in place -for increasing the economic clout of Arctic coastal states.
The most significant increase in shipping activity is within destinational and intra-Arctic shipping, which is especially visible in the many applications for the usage of the waters of the Northern Sea Route (NSR). In 2017, 664 permits were issued by The Northern Sea Route Administration, most of which will not be full transits but rather depart from one specific place (Tasker, 2008) . While a movement into the central Arctic Ocean, and thus into international waters, would benefit not only coastal states -since on the high seas the principle of the 'freedom of the seas' (Art. 78 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea -UNCLOS) applies -few species are in fact likely to move that far north due to depth and temperature reasons (Hollowed, Planque, & Loeng, 2013; Haug et al. 2017; Wegge, 2015; Wegge, Geoffroy, & Berge, 2017 (Hoel, 2014; Loeng, 2013; Christiansen, 2017; Bouchard et al., 2017) . In these areas, the Arctic coastal states have the exclusive right of managing fishing.
There is also evidence in the political realm that the changing geography of the Arctic has Finally, institutionally the A5 as an ad hoc forum has been able to act, to some degree, as an active Arctic political player. The formation has succeeded in putting some issues on political agendas while keeping others off. In May 2008, the foreign ministers of the A5 met in Ilulissat, Greenland, which resulted in the adoption of the Ilulissat Declaration (Arctic Five, 2008 The Ilulissat declaration seems to outline an agenda for cooperation between the littoral states of the Arctic Ocean over high level ocean policy issues, potentially challenging the Arctic Council with its eight members, broad focus and soft work on environmental protection and sustainable development.
Criticism of the A5 format by the other Arctic states (Petersen, 2009, p. 51) indicates its importance and relevance, in the sense that it is indeed seen as a potentially powerful institution.
Iceland's role is especially interesting. On the one hand, Iceland heavily criticized the exclusive A5 meetings, but on the other hand, the country has shown increasing attempts to be recognized This is an agreement with an initial term of 16 years, 'after which it will automatically be extended every five years unless a country objects or until science-based fisheries quotas and rules are put in place' (Barents Observer, 2017) . This example demonstrates that the A5 are taking the initiative in establishing rules and norms for the regulation of fishing in the central Arctic Ocean before inviting other non-A5 countries into the negotiations towards a binding agreement (Wegge, 2015; Wegge et al., 2017) . In this case, the A5 explicitly justified their competency in pushing forward with this initiative through their geographical position as coastal states whose exclusive economic zones border the Arctic high seas areas (Arctic Five, 2014 At the turn of the millennium, the NCM was reformed to adapt to the new post-Cold War political environment, emphasizing the importance of external cooperation (Larsen, 1998, pp. 16-18) . Nevertheless, in spite of the reform process, the NCM was also viewed as losing importance, particularly as Sweden and Finland in 1995 joined Denmark in becoming EU members, increasing the focus on the European arena at the cost of Nordic cooperation (Heidar, 2004, pp. 21-22; Norden, 2014a; Larsen, 1998, p. 215) . The reformed NCM engaged in new areas of external cooperation at the dawn of the new millennium, as the Baltic Sea region, Belorussia, and the Barents region in particular became new priorities. During this period, 'Arctic issues' also became an area of interest within the 'Adjacent Areas policy'. At the same time, there can be no doubt that the focus directed south-and eastwards were by far the most important (Heidar, 2004; Norden, 2014a; Olesen, 2011; Hagemann, 2014, p. 30) .
The period from the late 1990s until 2007 has been interpreted as a period of stagnation in the Nordic Council (Olesen, 2011, pp. 32-33) . The NCM's budget declined relative to the Nordic states' growth in GDP. At the same time, the EU gained importance for the Nordic countries, a development that was particularly felt by EU-outsiders Norway and Iceland (Olesen, 2011, p. 33) . When scrutinizing the specific Arctic interest during this period, one finds that circumpolar
Arctic issues only played a minor role in the NCM before the turn of the millennium (Stokke, 2007; Norden, 2009) . 'red-letter day in the history of Nordic co-operation' according to NCM reports (Archer, 2010, pp. 48-49; Norden, 2010) . Several proposals from the Stoltenberg report materialized, for example through the five Nordic nations' establishment of NORDEFCO in 2009, a new formal defense cooperation structure, which was unthinkable in the heyday of the strong EU orientation by Nordic states only a few years earlier (NORDEFCO, 2014) . The Stoltenberg Report, and subsequently NORDEFCO, with its strong focus on Arctic and maritime issues, has been argued to fit primarily Norwegian security interests and strengthened the Norwegian ability to set the agenda in the NCM (Olesen, 2011, p. 32) .
The former marginalization of Norway and Iceland in the NCM was hence changing. The developments in the Arctic had also been acknowledged in the Stoltenberg report, increasing the region's importance, and several new concerns pertaining to northern issues were displayed:
The Nordic countries are responsible for the management of large sea areas. Climate change and melting of the sea ice will open the way for considerable activity in these areas, including new shipping routes through Arctic waters to the Pacific Ocean. This means that Nordic cooperation in the northern seas and the Arctic is highly relevant (Stoltenberg report, p.6).
The report went on to suggest that a Nordic maritime response force, with expertise on Arctic conditions, should be set up, in addition to the establishment of a Nordic amphibious unit capable of operations in the Arctic.
More attention was thus gradually paid to the large sea areas in the Nordic region, thereby putting the concerns of the three western Nordic states higher on the agenda. This new focus on the Arctic was also reflected in the Nordic cooperation and beyond, where then foreign minister of Norway, Jonas Gahr Støre, played a key role (Olesen, 2011, p.31) .
Through skillful diplomacy, Støre made the Arctic dimension more prominent within the Nordic cooperation (Archer, 2010; Dodds & Ingimundarson, 2012, p. 33; Olesen, 2011, pp. 30-31 The NCM's enhanced attention to the Arctic has redirected its focus westward, thereby giving the organization a new interest in Arctic 'bordering' states such as Canada but also the U.S., the Republic of Ireland, and Scotland/UK. These states are now integrated into several of the NCM's cooperation programs, for example within knowledge exchange on issues of climate change adaptation and mitigation, and work on indigenous issues. Additionally, Nordic cooperation is now also funding the University of the Arctic, focusing on higher education in a circumpolar context (Norden, 2014b) . It should also be recognized how Asian actors have been particularly interested in establishing relationships with the West Nordic states, which is exemplified through the broad Chinese interest in political and commercial cooperation with Greenland, Iceland, and Norway (Nielsson, 2013; Jakobson & Peng, 2012; Jakobson, 2010, p.13; Gang, 2012, pp.362-363, 369) . Hence, the 'peripheral role' experienced by Norway, Iceland, and Denmark/Greenland from the late 1990s and early 2000s has indeed changed during recent years. While sea ice in late summer has decreased significantly in recent years, this has not happened to the same extent all over the Arctic. Rather, decreasing sea ice has been especially large north of the Russian coast and considerably less within Canadian waters. This is because sea ice thickness generally increases from the Siberian side of the Arctic to the Canadian archipelago, largely in response to the mean pattern of sea ice drift and convergence, and because air temperatures are generally lower on the Canadian side of the Arctic Ocean (Walsh, 2004, p. 190) . Consequently, the remnant ice pack will tend to shift towards North America, even in warmer summers. Thus, 'despite wide-spread retreat of sea ice around the Arctic Basin, it is clear that the unusual geography of the Canadian Arctic archipelago creates exceptionally complex sea ice conditions and a high degree of variability for the decades ahead' (ACIA, 2004, p. 85) .
Giving the proximity of many of the marine routes of the NEP and the NSR to the Russian coast, Russia is able to set norms and rules regulating Arctic shipping in this area. With the extension of the shipping season, these rules play a significant role for actors interested in using Further, Canada shows little political will to support Arctic shipping through its archipelago due to political and legal reasons. If international shipping through the NWP were to increase substantially, Canada's argument that there is no international strait going through the NWP would be substantially weakened. Canada argues that for a strait to qualify as international, an actual degree of international usage is necessary, which thus far has been rather meager along the NWP. In contrast, the US argues that the potential usage of a strait is enough to qualify as international. Canada's limited interest in developing the NWP is also reflected in its minor investments into infrastructure. There are basically no deep-water ports throughout the Canadian archipelago (Arctic Council, 2009, p. 178) . Despite the many announcements of the government to invest and improve the infrastructure situation in the North, little has been implemented (Byers, 2011, p. 69) . In sum, even if the NWP were to experience similar ice reductions and increasingly extended ice-free periods like the Eurasian Arctic, it is doubtful whether this would increase Canada's clout as a shipping nation.
In addition to political factors, there is also little economic incentive for Canada to develop Canadian Arctic shipping. Canada's biggest ports are located close to the U.S. border and Canada's main international shipping markets are the U.S., Asia/Oceania, and Europe, for which in most instances Arctic routes do not make geographical sense. In contrast, the importance of the NSR for Russian domestic transport and foreign interests in northern transit indicate the high relevance and competitiveness of the NEP and NSR in comparison to other non-Arctic routes.
Historical factors could also explain Russia's stronger standing as an Arctic shipping country.
The NSR was used as a national transport route already during the Soviet days. The highest amount of cargo volume transported on the NSR was during the late 1980s, with around seven million tons in 1987, though it declined after the break-up of the Soviet Union to 1.5 million in the late 1990s. Because of this history of usage, more infrastructure is available along the Russian coast, despite in many cases being in dire need of an overhaul (Arctic Council, 2009; Gunnarsson, 2013) .
Case 4: The European Arctic and the European Union
In the initial years of the new millennium, Norway -as a European Arctic country -worked actively to get the EU to pay attention to the Norwegian High North. However, when the EU finally became interested, observers in the EU began complaining that Norway and the other Arctic states 'suddenly did not want the EU to engage in the Arctic any more' (Personal communication, EU Arctic expert, March 6, 2012). While such views might be told in a witty fashion, they highlight an interesting development in the EU's relationship to the Arctic.
In the case of Norway, the initial years of the new millennium were certainly a period when the government tried hard to inform the EU about the importance of the Norwegian High North.
The 'High North dialogues' focused on how petroleum from the Norwegian shelf could provide future energy security to the EU (Offerdal, 2010; Pedersen, 2008; Government of Norway, 2005 (Pedersen, 2008; Wallis & Arnold, 2011) . As a result, several Arctic states became more reserved toward the potential of increased EU engagement in the Arctic, which was a skepticism that the EU experienced in particular through its difficulties in becoming an accredited observer to the Arctic Council.
In Norway, a key foreign policy debate during the late 1990s and early 2000s centered on the concept of 'marginalization' with respect to being left outside the EU (Kux & Sverdrup, 2000, p. 263) . While certainly strengthening the EU, the end of the Cold War could also be interpreted as having reduced the political importance of Norway and the Arctic region, from the point of view of Brussels, as the need to bolster its defense against the Soviet Union was diminished, and the most dynamic regions were found in places other than the Arctic (Rieker, 2004, p. 385; Offerdal, 2010, p. 3 
CONCLUSION
This article explored whether a unique 'geo'-component exists or makes sense in IR, and if changes in geography can explain changes in states' power potential. Taking into account how the physical aspects of geography might play into politics and society is a dimension that traditionally has been exaggerated in traditionally geopolitical reasoning, leading to determinism. On the other hand, good arguments can be made that this 'more than human' component (Squire, 2015) has been downplayed or ignored by mainstream critical geopolitical thinking. Some critical scholars have recently addressed this critique: 'An appreciation of "the efficacy of matter" is therefore critical, yet conceived as beyond the grasp of established ways of thinking' (Squire, 2015, p. 148 There are several indications that geographical factors having empowered Russia more than
Canada as an actor in Arctic shipping. However, while a milder climate explains important changes as well as differences between the two Arctic states in the time frame investigated, economic, political, and historical factors are also important in impeding Canada from becoming an Arctic shipping power.
Finally, our empirical investigation indicates that geographical changes in the Arctic indeed have had an effect on power relations within Europe. As increased international attention towards the Arctic region also pertains to the EU, empirical evidence suggests that the European Arctic states, Sweden, Finland, Norway, Iceland, and Denmark have achieved a more prominent standing. Overall, this article shows that geography is indeed an important factor in IR, in the sense that it can play a role in how state actors are empowered or not. However, as could also be shown, isolating this effect is very hard, thus pointing to the 'intra-actions' between physical/material and social/discursive approaches to geopolitics, the further investigation of which remains an urgent need in geopolitical research.
